RECENT CASES
CARRIERS.
The plaintiffs inquired of the defendant railroad company's agent
the rate on potatoes, for the purpose of ascertaining the price at which
they could quote potatoes at a distant point. The agent,
through an innocent mistake, referred to a tariff that
Rates:
had been superseded, and quoted a rate 251/2 cents per
False Reprehundred pounds lower than that actually in force at that
sentation
time. The plaintiffs, relying on the information given
by the agent, quoted a price at the point in question, received orders
at that price, and shipped three carloads of potatoes. The consignees
had to pay the higher rate, and deducted the difference from the plaintiff's draft, paying only the balance. Urquhart Co. v. R. WY. Co., ii
Western L. R. (Canada) 425.
The Court first pointed out the fact that all the elements necessary
to support the action of tort for deceit were not present, since the
person making the representation had not made it without honest belief
in its truth. In order to find this necessary constituent of deceit present, they must have held the principal and agent to be completely identified for the purpose of knowledge of the falsity of the representation. The Court animadverted on the doubtful nature of this proposition, but avoided deciding it, although there is authority in support of
the theory of the identity of principal and agent in such a situation.
Fuller v. Wilson, 9 Q. B. 629; Fitzsimrons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129.
The weight of authority is, however, opposed to this proposition.
Derry v. Peek, L. R. 14, A. C. 337, 375; Le Lievre v. Gould, L. R. 1893,
i Q. B. D. 491, 5oo; and the decision was wisely rested upon a ground
the soundness of which cannot be questioned. A common carrier is
under a common law duty to give information concerning rates. This
duty is not altered by the Railway Act, sec. 339, sub-sec. 3, which is
merely modal. A breach of this duty resulting proximately in damage
gives a right of action on the case. Barley v. Warford, 9 Q. B. 196,
2o6; Low v. Bouverie, L. R. I89I, 3 Ch. D. 82, oo.
DESCENT.
The plaintiff's father was a Tonawanda Indian, and her mother a
squaw of the Seneca tribe, who had moved to the Tonawanda reservation and there been married. The mother was never
recognized as a member of her husband's tribe. AccordKinship by
Mother Right ing to the ancient custom of the Indians all clan and
tribal relations follow that of the mother rather than
that of the father. Consequently on the father's death
the tribe distributed his property among his nephews, the defendants,
completely cutting off the plaintiff. It was held that this distribution
was illegal. That since the Indians have adopted the ways of civiliza(20)
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tion, the reasons for the enforcement of the old custom no longer exist,
and that their tribal relations should be. determined by the rule of the
common law, by which the lineage of the child follows that of the
father. Hatch v. Luckman, ii8 N. Y. Supp. (i9o9) 689.
Among all barbaric tribes this so-called custom of kinship by mother
right has been enforced. This was chiefly because marital relations
were loose and uncertain, and it was often difficult to determine the
paternity of a child. It was practically the universal custom among
the North American Indians. The question whether our courts should
recognize this custom as existing among the Indians has been frequently
raised, where a half-breed, indicted under a criminal statute, expressly
exempting Indians from its operation, claims that exemption, because
his mother was an Indian. The earliest decision is U. S. v. Sanders,
Hempstead (j847), 483. There it was decided that the quantum of
Indian blood in the veins of the child did not determine its condition,
but that the status of the mother decided the question. This followed
the rule of the civil law as to the offspring of a freeman and a slave.
The first point in this decision has been affirmed by later cases, the
second overruled. Ex parte Reynolds, 5 Dill. (1879) 394; U. S. v.
Ward, 42 Fed. (1890) 320. The common law adopted the civil law rule
partus sequitur ventrem, only as to slaves and other property, and
never as to the offspring of free persons. Indians are freemen. Hence
their status is that of their fathers'. Our principal case is in accord
with this almost universal rule.
In Ohio the quantum of Indian blood in the veins of the offspring
decides its legal status. If he has more white blood than Indian blood,
he is a white person. A half-breed, therefore, is considered an Indian, irrespective of his mother's or father's status. Lane v. Baker, r2
Ohio (1843), 237. An exception to the general rule of the Reynolds
case, supra, has been recognized in a recent line of cases. Where the
child of a white father and an Indian mother is abandoned by the
father and reared by the Indian mother in the tribal relation, it follows the status of the mother and is regarded as an Indian. U. S. v.
Higgins, io3 Fed. (I90) 348; Farrell v. U. S., IIo Fed. (i90I) 945.
But mere residence on an Indian reservation without an abandonment
on the part of the father is not sufficient to change the status of the
offspring. U. S. v. Hadley, 93 Fed. (i9oo) 437.
EQUITY PRACTICE.
In the case of Keystone Lumber Co. v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., et al.,
5o South. Rep. (i909) 445, the plaintiff filed a bill f6r discovery ana
also prayed a decree for the amount of reciprocal deDiscovery anld

murrage charges, a combination, which if granted, would

amount to full relief. The defendant demurred, which
Relief in
demurrer was sustained, but on appeal the Supreme
Equity:
Remedy ExistCourt reversed this ruling and remanded the case for
Law
ing at
answer.
The right to discovery in equity has been long existant, and was formerly much used, the law courts being unable to force
the production of certain evidence. But this defect has been largely
remedied by statute, and consequently, where the jurisdiction of equity in this regard has not been expressly abolished-as it has in a
few states-tho' the right to discovery remains, it is rarely used. How-
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ever, where the bill for discovery has attached to it a petition for
relief, a very difficult condition is presented. If the case be one
founded on equitable jurisdiction, relief, after the Court has become
familiar with the discovered facts, will often be given. Street, Fed.
Equity Prac., sec. I865, but where the case is one founded in law, the
general practice is for, the Court to refuse to act.
McKeon v. Lane, 9 Paige (N. Y. 1829), 520; Law v. Thorndyke,
20 Pick. (Mass. 1838) 317; Sugar Beets Product Co. v. Lyons Refining Co., 161 Fed. (1898) 216.
Practically, since it is possible in almost every case to concoct some
legitimate ground for a discovery, if the equity courts would grant
relief, once they were in possession of the facts, nearly every case
could, by skillful manipulation, be thrown into equity and the time
honored system of trial by jury done away with.
The Court bases its decision on the Mississippi Constitution of i8go,
and two Mississippi cases which apparently extend to equity the right,
once it has entertained a bill for discovery, to go on and extend full
relief, notwithstanding the existence of a full and adequate remedy,
both as to the discovery and relief, at law. The only other recent
cases we have been able to find in line with this practice are Smith v.
Smith's Adin., 92 Va. (1896) 696; Collins v. Sutton, 94 Va. 127; Thompson v. Iron Co., 41 W. Va. (1895) 574. It would seem, however, that
the general trend of the modern decisions on this point are the other
way, and properly so, if we are to preserve that fundamental element
in our law, the right, in most cases, to trial by jury. Cecil National
Bank v. Thurber, 59 Fed. (894) 913; Sugar Beets Product Co. v.
Lyons Refining Co., 161 Fed. (1908) 215; N. & W. R. R. Co. v. Storey,
17 Conn. (1845) 364; Elk Brewing Co. v. Neubert, 213 Pa. (19o6) 171.
LIBEL.
In the case of Fowler v. Nankin, ii Western Reporter, 586 (Canada,
i9og), the plaintiff and defendalit had entered into partnership for a
year to conduct a theatre upon certain agreements, one of
Innuendo
which was, that on either party becoming insolvent, the
partnership should cease. Before the end of the term, the defendant
wrote to the plaintiff that as the latter was unable to meet his liabilities, the defendant determined the partnership. The defendant also
published in a daily newspaper of Edmonton:"Notice.
"The Grand Family Theatre has been closed. The undersigned will
not be liable for any debts contracted on behalf of the Grand Theatre
Co. by Robert L. Fowler.
"S. .Nankin."
Harvey, J., with Beck, J., concurring held these words libellous,
as the necessary inference to be drawn from them is that they contain a reflection on the honesty of the plaintiff. The purpose of the
notice, said the Court, was to prevent the plaintiff from contracting
debts for which he, the defendant, might be liable, and as there would
be no necessity for such a notice unless the plaintiff were likely to
attempt to contract such debts, which the notice states he has no right
to do, the innuendo is clearly against the honesty of the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the Court went over the line in holding this to
be libel, and that the view of Stuart, J., dissenting, was the correct
one where he said, "the only impression the ordinary man would take

RECENT CASES
LIBEL (Continued).
from the words would be, that Fowler and Nankin had been connected with each other in some way in the business of the Grand
Theatre Co., that the affair had shut down, that the parties had disagreed, and that Nankin wished to warn people that he would not consider himself liable for what the other man would do."
These words would hardly convey to the ordinary man the suggestion that Nankin was afraid Fowler would act in bad faith. Even if
these words are capable of the meaning that Fowler might do something he knew he had no right to do, there is nothing in the evidence
to show that they conveyed that meaning to the mind of any person
who read them.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
The plaintiff was a brakeman in the employ of the defendant company. In running by the side of his train waiting for an opportunity
to seize a grab-rail, he stumbled on a clinker about onehalf the size of a man's head, and was injured by the
Assumption
of Risk
wheels of the train passing over his legs. The station
master had neglected to clean the yard as directed by
the orders of the company. Vaillancourt v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 74
Atl. (Vt. i9og) 99.
The decision in this case when considered in the light of the generally accepted methods of railroad operation, extends the liability of
the master to an alarming extent. The duty to provide a safe place
to work is a personal one which the master cannot escape by delegation. But it is not an absolute duty. On proof of injury the master
is not prima facie liable. The obligation is that due care must be
used under the circumstances; what is such reasonable care as will
satisfy, the duty must depend upon the circumstances and the dangers fairly to be comprehended. C. & A. R. R. v. Eaton, 96 Il1. App.
57o, 1 Sherman & Redfield; Neg., sec. 185. Whether the care used by
the master is sufficient is a mixed question of law and fact; generally
it is for the jury, but it may in a given case cease to be such and become a question of law. This is particularly true when a rule of law
is applied to determine the effect of a party's conduct. Browne v.
Siegel, Cooper & Co., i9I Ill. 226; Wigmore v. Evid., sec. 2552.
It may be seriously doubted whether the Court was correct in submitting this case to the jury. The care required of the master is directed toward the end of providing for the servant a working place
which is as reasonably safe as is compatible with its nature and surroundings. It cannot be that a railroad in order to fully meet the
obligations of that duty must sweep its yards.
But granting that the railroad was negligent (for if it was not,
there could, of course, be no recovery), some of the authorities would
question the right of the plaintiff to recover in any case on the ground
of assumption of risk. This doctrine, the reasons for which have been
variously stated, is founded upon the voluntary association of the
servant with the master in his business. Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18
Q. B. D. 685. This question, like that of negligence, is ordinarily one
for the jury, but in the same manner may be one for the Court when
the just inference to be drawn from the facts would lead reasonable
men to the same conclusion. Whether a servant assumes the risk of
his master's negligence has been productive of much diversity in the
decisions. Under one view of the question, such risks are not assumed; the ordinary' risks of the service are, under this view, those
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which remain after the master has performed his primary duty of
using reasonable care to see that the premises are safe. Swensen v.
Bender, 114 Fed. i; 2 Mary. (Del.) 337; Himrod Co. v. Clark, I97
Ill. 514; Louisville R. R. v. Vestal, 105 Kty. 461; 49 S. W. 204.
On the other hand, the doctrines of non-assumption of risk of the
master's negligence does not apply to a permanent condition created
by previous negligence of the master of which the servant has knowledge. Porter v. S. S. Co., 113 Ga. ioo7; Dempsey v. Sawyer, 95 Me.

295; Sanderson v. Lumber Co., 55 L. R. A. 9o8; Browne v. Siegel,
Cooper & Co., i9i Ill. 226; C. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Hennessey, 38 C. C.
A., and notes; Thompson, Neg., sec. 4614. The servant is not required
to inspect the premises to determine whether the master has performed
his duty or not. Of course, the servant does not assume the risk of
the master's negligence, but when the master has been negligent to
the knowledge of the servant and the servant continues in the employment without objection, he assumes the risk. The risk with which
the servant is sought to be charged, must be open and obvious and
known to the servant as of such a character that the servant will be
charged with knowledge. The danger must be appreciated, i. e., one
which a man of ordinary prudence would not face. Dempsey v. Sawyer, 95 Me. 295. Hence the decision in the principal case may be questioned on this second ground.
The question of contributory negligence must depend on the prior
negligence of the master, and on the above supposition the Court was
correct in submitting the question to the jury, there being evidence
tending to show that the servant was not negligent in not seeing and
avoiding the clinker.
In Hughes v. R. R., 27 Minn. 137, under similar facts, recovery
was denied, the Court holding that the servant assumed the risk.
In Anderson v. Pittsburg Coal Co., et al., 122 N. W. R. 7g4, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota decided, that where the plaintiff, engaged as a coal heaver in unloading the hold of the
defendant's boat, was knocked down by a coal bucket
Vice.
Prlncipals

operated by a crane (which had acquired "too much

swing"), because the hatch tender signaled the hoister
to stop it and drop it down, but did not warn the plaintiff as his custom and duty required, that the failure of the hatch tender to give the
plaintiff the customary warning before the bucket was lowered, was
the negligence of a vice-principal and not of a fellow-servant.
The Court reached this conclusion by the premises that:
(a) The defendant had intrusted an absolute non-assignable duty
to the hatch tender.
(b) Delegation to an employ6 of the duty of taking such measures
as are within the power of the master to protect employ~s against
danger while at work cannot relieve the master from liability if the
employ6 to whom such duty is imputed does not exercise reasonable
care in its discharge.
(c) A person charged by the master to give warning is a viceprincipal.
Judge laggard's opinion gives a most excellent list of authorities
on each side of the question, but the decision seems to be contra to
the weight of authority in this country. The general rule seems to
be in accord with the following cases:
A servant of a street car company who failed to give timely warn-
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ing of the approach of a car to other employees engaged in track
repairing, was held to be a fellow-servant of the repairers, and not a
vice-principal. Lundquist v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 387
(1896).
A hatch tender employed to give warning of the approach of falling bales, is not a vice-principal, as respects a servant of the defendant
in the hold relying on the hatch tender's care, but a fellow-servant.
The Ocean Steamship Co. v. Cheeney, 86 Ga. 278 (i8go).
If a master has properly selected and instructed a competent man
to give warning to his other employees of the movements of machinery involving danger to them, such as apparatus for unloading coal
from a vessel, he will not be responsible for an injury to one of said
employees caused by a negligent failure of such man to give the
warning. Portance v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., ioI Wis. 574 (899).
MECHANICS' LIENS.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that section 38, of the
Mechanics' Lien Act of June 4, i9oi, P. L. 431, which permits a claim
to be filed against a building without reference to the
Constitution- land and further provides for a sale and removal of
ality of Mesuch building for the benefit of lien holders, is unconchanics' Lien
stitutional, as violating article III, sec. 7, of the State
Act of 1901
Constitution, which prohibits special legislation providing or changing methods of collecting debts. Henry
Taylor Lumber Co. v. Carnegie Institute, 225 Pa. 486 (igo9). The
whole Mechanics' Lien law, says Mr. Justice Brown, is legislation for
a special class of creditors, only supportable on the theory that the
Constitution of 1894 did not strike down existing systems of practice.
As this is the third section of the act of i9or that has met with the
disapproval of the Supreme Court [Vulcanite P. C. Co. v. Allisof, 220
Pa. 382 (sec. 28); Vulcanite P. Co. v. Philadelphia R. T. Co., 220 Pa.
603 (see. 46)], it would seem safe to predict a similar fate for other
new features of the law, which was one of several practice acts that
were recommended by the State Bar Association, but were somewhat
altered on their passage through the legislature. Few would shed
tears if the whole system of mechanics' liens was abolished. It is
special legislation of the most flagrant sort, while the practice has
become so cumbersome as to constitute a nuisance to the legal profession.
NEGLIGENCE.
Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., 225 Pa. 348 (igo), is a
decision under the Pennsylvania Act of May 2, I905, P. L. 352, section two, of which reads, "No child under fourteen
years of age shall be employed in any establishment."
ActRegulttng
the EmployThe plaintiff, a boy under fourteen years of age, had
ment
of
Chilhis hand crushed in attempting to clean a pipe in which
dren In Industhere was a rapidly revolving wheel, while in the emtrial Establishments
ployment of the defendant. The Court held, that by
the very nature of the act, contributory negligence and
assumption of risk as possible defenses were excluded.
The employment of the boy in violation of the Act was sufficient evidence of negligence, and the negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury, for clearly the accident would not have happened but for
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the plaintiff's illegal employment. This decision follows an earlier
case involving the same Act. Sullivan v. Hanover Cordage Co., 222
Pa. 40 (igoS), which in turn was based on Lenahan v. Pittston Coal
Mining Co., 218 Pa. 311 (i9o7),

a decision under an act prohibiting

the employment of boys under fifteen years of age in coal mines.
In New York, under an act containing essentially the same provisions as the Pennsylvania one, the same rule as regards contributory
negligence and assumption of risks was laid down. Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530 (19o3). This Court did not say the violation of
the act was sufficient evidence of negligence but some evidence. That
some confusion on the subject exists in New York is quite evident
from the recent cases of Kircher v. Iron Clad Mnf. Co., 118 N. Y.
Supp. 823 (1gog), and Lee v. Sterling Silk Miif. Co., 118 N. Y. Supp.
852 (i9O9). The former case holds, the employment of a child in violation of the act makes out a prima facie case of negligence against the
employer, which may be rebutted by showing justification for believing
the child to be over the age limit. Marino v. Lehmaier is followed as
regards contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The latter
case makes a startling departure from that rule and says question of
contributory negligence is for the jury, the violation of the act being
some evidence of negligence. These cases are not expressions of opinion from the highest court in New York with the exception of Marino
v. Lehmaier. It looks as though another case will have to be taken
there to ascertain just what the law really is on this point.
In the case of the Indian Refining Co. v. Mobley, 121 S. W. (Ky.)
657 (19o9), the plaintiff, a life insurance solicitor, was injured by the
explosion of a boiler on the premises of the defendant.
Inlury to
The plaintiff was there by permission of the defendant
Licensee
to solicit insurance among his employ~s. Recovery of
damages for his personal injuries was not allowed on
the ground, that he was a mere licensee and entered the defendant's
premises at his peril. This decision is in accord with the authorities,
if the cause of the boiler explosion was the construction of the boiler
and not the negligence of the defendant's servants in their use of it.
The evidence on this point was not clear. One witness said the steam
pipes were badly constructed, but he attributed the explosion directly
to the carelessness of the defendant's employ~s. If the latter were
the cause, then the case should have been decided differently. See
Gallagher v. Humphrey, 6 L. T. R. (N. S.) 684 (1862), and these
American cases De Haven v. Henncssey Bros. and Evans Co., 137 Fed.
472 (19o5) ; Corriganv. Union Sugar Refy., 98 Mass. 577 (1868). The
licensee takes the premises as they exist. Hence if he be injured by
their faulty construction, it is his misfortune. But where negligence
on the part of the person granting the permission or his servants, after
the license is granted, is shown, the licensee can recover. The licensor
cannot further endanger the safety of the licensee by some additional
act.
Where a person stores dynamite in a small building within a few
inches of a red hot stove, with percussion caps lying on the floor, he
will be liable for injuries caused by the explosion of the
Dynamite
(199).

dynamite. Kiser v. Kerbaugh, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 163
What more need be said? See Kerbaugh v. Caldwell, 151

Fed. 194; Derry Coal & Coke Co. v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 448; Sowers v.
McManus, 214 Pa. 244, and the oft quoted phrase sic itur ad astra.
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PUBLIC OFFICERS.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held, in Stevens v. Sims, 104
Pacific (Okla. igog), 44, in conformity with the majority of jurisdictions, that the payment of an official salary to a de facto
officer-not an intruder-and not having been judicially
Salary of
determined not to be the de jure officer-is a valid deDeJureOflicer fense to a claim against the public corporation, in an
action against it by the de jure officer; holding that the
municipality being interested only in having the duties of such office
properly performed, should not be required to assume the responsibility for payment of such salary to him who holds the office under color
of title and has performed the duties thereof, or the trouble of requiring the disputants to interplead therefor.
Although it has been held in several jurisdictions that a de facto
officer is entitled to compensation for the time he has actually held
office, the sounder and now generally established rule is that he cannot maintain any action against the city or county therefor; Dolan v.
N. Y., 69 N. Y. 274; and may be compelled to account for emoluments
received, to the officer te lure in any appropriate action. U. S. v. Addison, 6 Wall. 291. This being true, it would seem that the officer de
jure has a property right in such salary dependent not upon his performance of the duties of office, but his title thereto; and more sound
judicial principles seem to be expressed in those decisions contra which
hold that such right is not impaired by the payment of the salary to
a de facto officer.
QUO WARRANTO.
In State, ex rel., Richards,Atty.-Gen. v. Brooks, 74 Atl. (Del. i9o9)
37, an information in the nature of quo warranto averred that the defendants were unlawfully exercising the offices of direcQuo Warranto tors in the B. Company, a corporation created by and
to Try Title to existing under he General Corporation Laws of that
Office
State. On motion to dismiss the information the Court
held that title to a public franchise is properly triable by
information in quo warranto; that the sole issue is the title to the
franchise, and therefore the information would not be dismissed because it would be ineffective, in that it could not determine which of
the alleged directors is to be substituted for the one whose right to
the office is questioned.
The ancient writ of quo warranto and its successor, the information, must be carefully distinguished. This is often of great importance on a question of jurisdiction. State v. Ashley, i Ark. 279. The
writ of quo warranto was a high prerogative writ, in the nature of a
writ of right for the King, issuing out of Chancery, against one who
usurped any office, franchise or liberty of the Crown to inquire by
what authority he supported his claim, in order to determine the right.
Being in the nature of a writ of right, the judgment was conclusive
even against the Crown. 3 Blacks. Com., sec. 262. By the statutes of
quo warranto, 6 and 18 Edw. I, jurisdiction of the writ was given to
the King's justices in eyre, and while it is uncertain at what time the
writ fell into disuse, it is probable that it passed away with the abolition of the circuits of the justices in eyre. The complexity of the
procedure and the fact that it was civil in character probably contributed to its downfall. While the writ and the information existed formerly side by side, the latter has continued as a remedy for many
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centuries since the former ceased to be used. The information was
originally criminal in character, entailing a fine and judgment of ouster.
In its later development it lost its criminal character in all except the
forms of procedure, which it still retains. It was still, however, a
prerogative writ, and it was not until Statute 9 Anne, Ch. 20, that it
became the means of trying title by private persons in respect to public franchises and offices. By the same statute the extension of the
remedy was confined to England and Wales, so that it did not extend
to the American colonies. That statute, however, did recognize that
a practice by information ik the nature of quo warranto had formerly
been usual, and it may be that this more restricted procedure is the
parent of the remedy in use to-day in this country.
Whatever the exact origin of the information may be, it is well
recognized as applicable to try title to public franchises. It is the
proper means of trying title to office in a private corporation. State v.
Stewart, 6 Houst. (Del.) 359; Atty.-Gen. v. Looker, ii Mich. 498.
This was formerly doubted but is now well established. In England
it is held that the remedy is not applicable unless the duties of the
office are in some way of a public nature. Queen v. Grimshaw, io Ad.
& E. (U. S.) 747; 2 Cook, Corporations, sec. 617. But, as is suggested
in the principal case, an office designed to execute a franchise granted
by the State must necessarily partake of the public nature of the franchise itself. The remedy is proper to test the legality of a corporation. Atty.-Gen. v. American Tobacco Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 847, 42 AtI.
1117; to enforce forfeiture of charter and franchises of a corporation for misuser or non-user. 32 Cyc. 1427; Atty.-Gen. v. N. Y., N. H.
& H. R. R. Co., 83 N. E. (Mass. i9o8) 4o8; and to public offices generally, High, Ex. Rem., sec. 6o9.
SALES.
At the defendant's request, the plaintiff shipped to him a cash register, and in "consideration of the above" the defendant paid a sum
down and gave promissory note for the balance, payable
in installments, agreeing in case of default in any payment, all unpaid payments should become at once due
Conditional
and payable, and finally that the title should not pass to
Liability of
Purchaser on
Destruction of the buyer until the price was paid in full. After loss by
fire without the defendant's fault and his refusal to
the Property
make a payment due, it was held that the defendant
became liable on the note. National Cash Register Co.
v. South Bay Club House Asso'n., I8 N. Y. Supp. (1919) io44.
The general principle of liability on notes given for the purchase
money of personal property where title is retained for security for
payment, has been often before the courts, and the weight of authority supports the conclusion here reached, viz., that the purchaser is
liable on such notes though the property which is the subject matter
of the sale has been destroyed without his fault. Whitlock v. Auburn
Lumber Co., 58 S. E. (N. C. 1907) 909; Burnley v. Tufts, 5 So. (Miss.

'888) 627; Tufts v. Grifin, io L. R. A. (N. C. i8go) 526. The distinguishing characteristic of these cases, found also in the principal
case, is the fact that at the payment of the last installment due for
the purchase price either on the general credit of the purchaser or on
his note or notes given therefor, the title is to pass from the vendor
without anything more being done. See Osborne v. South Shore Lumber Co., 65 N. W. (Wis. 1895) 184.
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Most of the cases which are in apparent conflict with the principal
case are, therefore, to be distinguished by reason of some provision in
the contract between the parties that at the final payment, the vendor
will execute a bill of sale, or sell and transfer, etc., the property to the
purchaser. Swallow v. Emery, i, Mass. 355 (execute a bill of sale) ;
Arthur v. Blackmal, 63 Fed. 536 (sell and transfer). But when the
contract lacks these or similar provisions, and it is clear that title was
meant to pass without anything else being done by the vendor, the
case has been treated with almost complete uniformity as being a sale,
and the relation of the parties as that of mortgagor and mortgagee
of a chattel, in effect if not in form. Osborne v. So. Shore Lumber
Co., supra; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Vaughan, 55 Atl. (N. J.
19o3) 54; .Jessup v. Fairbanks,Morse and Co., 78 N. E. (Ind. i9o6)
1O5O.
It is thought that an exception to the maxim res perit domino,
taken for granted as a settled rule of the common law in Rugg v. Minet,
iI East, 21o, was justified by the fact that the title was retained by
the seller only for purposes of security, and that to all other intents,
it had passed to the purchaser, subject to vesting absolutely in him
only on the payment of the price. Barrows v. Anderson, 3 Cent. Law
Jour. (Mo. 1876) 413. And that having received a quasi title to such
an extent and being able to demand nothing more in the way of action
from the vendor, the consideration for the purchaser's promise to pay
or for his note given, was held to be the receipt of the possession of
the goods and the acquisition of a right to the title absolutely on final
payment Burnley v. Tufts, supra; White v. Solomon, 42 N. E. (Mass.)
1O4.
Therefore, tho' the goods may have been destroyed before the
payment was due, without fault of the purchaser, by the weight of
authority it is considered there has been no failure of consideration.
American Soda FountainCo. v. Vaughn, supra; Kilner v. Moneyweight
Scale Co., 36 Ind. App. (1905) 568; Tufts v. Wynne, 45 Mo. App.
(1891) 42, and the purchaser must bear the loss.
On the other hand, the few cases parallel in fact with the principal
case, which have reached a different conclusion, have stuck doggedly
to the rule that the risk of loss attends the legal title. In Cobb v.
Tufts, 2 Tex. Civ. App. (Wilson), sec. 152, a plea of failure of consideration was held good and the loss placed on the vendor. In Randle
v. Stone, 77 Ga. 501, the vendee was treated as a bailee, and since the
loss was without fault of his, he was not liable to the seller. The
Alabama court reaffirmed earlier rulings to the same effect in that
state in Bishop v. Minderhout and Nichols, 128 Ala. (igoo) 162, tho'
recognizing the contrary decisions in many other states.
It is to be said of the cases placing the loss upon the vendee, that
they are a departure from the general rule that the iisk of loss falls
on the holder of the legal title. i Benj. on Sales, sec. 452.
The motive of such decisions appears to be a feeling that the purchaser who has had the possession and all possible chances to take
care, should bear the loss rather than the vendor, out of possession
and control, though no provable negligence of the former is shown.
Three distinct lines of reasoning are traceable in the cases, reaching
a conclusion in conformity with that feeling. The purchaser has made
an absolute promise to pay; it was not in the least conditional; had he
wished to avoid his present predicament, he should have made the
stipulation in his contract Burnley v. Tufts, supra. The transaction is in
effect, if not in form, a sale and a chattel mortgage, and the effect of
the transaction should be considered. Osborne v. So. Shore Lumber
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Co., supra; Williston on Sales, Sec. 4o4.

It is to be noted that this

employs a decided fiction in face of the express agreement that title
is not to pass, and is inconsistent in not going logically forward to require recording of the chattel mortgage. And finally, the queston is
put of what is the consideration for the promise or note. If it is the
passing of title, the defense of failure of consideration is good. Swallow v. Emery, supra. If it is the delivery of the property, with the right
to acquire a title immediately on payment, the consideraton has passed,
Anmercan Soda Fountain Co. v. Vaughn, supra. It is upon this last
theory that the principal case is reasoned.
The peculiar character of the contract, which is not a true sale on
condition precedent in its general sense, but which is something more
than an executory conditional sale, would seem to justify the feeling
to which reference is made above. Clear legal reasoning in conformity
thereto meets difficulties. Perhaps it is best given in the argument first
noted in the preceding paragraph, at least in cases where the terms
of the contract are not reduced to writing, so that they admit of a
clear determination as to the exact consideration for which the promise or note is given. In the present case, that being possible, the decision should be taken as sound and supported by reason as well as

authority.
STATUTES.
Vassey v. Spake, 65 S. E. (S. C. igog) 825, was an action for
malicious trespass upon real property. The question was raised whether
this action was included by a statute, which put certain
restrictions on any action "for assault, battery, false imInterpretation: prisonment, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, crimApplication of
inal conversation, seduction, or any other action for
Elutdemn
Generis Rule
damages for torts." It was held that the rule of ejusden generis was applicable, and that the action of
malicious trespass .didnot come within the proviso of the
statute as to "any other action for damages for torts."
This rule of ejusdern generis, sometimes known as Lord Tenderden's
rule, is generally stated as follows, "Where a statute or other document
enumerates several classes of persons or things and immediately following and classed with such enumeration, the clause embraces 'other'
persons or things, the word 'other' will generally be read as 'other
such like,' so that persons or things therein comprised may be read as
ejusdem generis with, and not of a quality superior to, or different
from, those specifically enumerated." 21 AM. & Eng. Encyc., Iloi. The
reason for this restrictive interpretation of the statute is given by
Kenyon, C. J., in Rex v. Wallis, 5 T. R. (1793) 379, where he says if
the legislature had not meant to restrict the working of the statute to
one particular class, it "would have used only one compendious word'
This rule is practically universal, but the courts differ widely in applying it to the facts of cases. A railway depot has been held ejusdem
generis with stores and warehouses. State v. Edwards, iog Mo. (i8gi)
315. Surface railroads are of the same class as underground and elevated street railroads. Ruckert v. Grand Ave. R. R. Co., 163 Mo. (9Ol)
26o. So in a very recent case in the United States Supreme Court, in
interpreting an act providing punishment for making and aiding false
entries in the customs, the words "owner, importer, consignee, agent
or other person" were held to include a government weigher. United
States v. Mescall, 215 U. S. 26 (igog). Under the broadest application
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of the rule, however, the decision in our principal case is sound, as
the personal torts enumerated are distinctly of a different class from
torts to property like malicious trespass. The rule of ejusdtem generis
is not always applied and in some case the word "other" has been held
to be unrestrictedly comprehensive. "Horses, mules, or other animals"
of a railroad company has been interpreted to include swine. Henderson v. Wabash R. R. Co., 8I Mo. (1884) 605. Reg. v. Payne, L. R. i
C. C. (1866) 27. Wherever the intention of the legislature is clearly
shown by the language of the statute, there is no room for construction,
and the rule does not apply. State v. Switzer, 59 S. C. (19oo) 225.
TAXATION.
The real estate of all literary and scientific institutions occupied by
them for these purposes, or by an officer thereof as a residence, is exempted from taxation in Maine under Rev. St. c. 9,Sec.
3. Held, that the chapter house of a Greek letter society
was liable to taxation, "its corporate purposes being
Fraternity
Houses:
either
Exemptions of nener literary nor scientific, but rather they are domestic in the nature of a private boarding house, and such
Literary and
Sce ntifi.
is the business it carries on." Inhabitants of Orono v.
Sigma Alpha Epsilon Society, 74 Atl. (Me. x919) x9.
Institutions
The decision here is supported by authority. It has
been pointed out by the Appellate Court of New York that the incorporation purposes of a society of similar character may be such as to
bring it within the exemption clauses of this class of statutes, but that
the test of actual exemption of property must be the purposes for which
that property is really used. P. ex rel. Delta Kappa Epsilon Society v.
Lawler, 77 N. Y. Supp. (i9o2) 84o, affirmed 71 N. E. (N. Y. 1903) 1136.
Exemptions from taxation by statutory provisions are strictly construed. State v. New Orleans R. R., 7 La. 724; St. Mary's College v.
Crowl, io Kan. 442. A house erected by the college within the Harvard
Yard and leased to a professor at an annual rental is not exempt from
taxation, though it would be otherwise if occupied by the permission
of the college, the occupant having no estate therein and paying no
rent. Pierce v. Inhabitants of Cambridge, 56 Mass. (i849) 611. A
somewhat broader view is taken in Northampton County v. Lafayette
College, 128 Pa. (1889) 132, where a building on the campus owned
by the college, and leased by it at an annual rental, was exempted from
taxation, the proceeds being devoted to the expenses of the college,
itself an educational institution within the exemption provisions. Where
no rent is paid by a professor occupying a house ovned by the college on its campus the dictum of the Massachusetts case supra is followed. Harvard College v. Assessors, 55 N. E. (Mass.) 844; State v.
Ross, 24 N. J. L. 497; Contra, Kendrick v. Farquahar,8 Ohio (1837)
In accord with the general idea expressed in
the Pennsylvania case
supra, it is generally held that college buildings occupied by students
as dormitories at a certain cost per annum, though payable to the college, are not taxable property, being occupied for the purposes of the
college. See Yale University v. New Haven, 42 Atl. (Conn.) 87; Williard v. Pike, p Atl. (Vt.) 907; People v. Mezger, 73 N. E. (N. Y.)
I13o. And a club house, the property of the institution, used by the
students and alumni for recreation and social purposes, was declared
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exempt in Chicago et al v. University of Chicago, 28 Ill. (I9O7), 1o
Ann. Cas. 669.
But where the buildings used by students as dormitories are not the
property of the college, nor does the income go to the college, they are
not exempt. Phi Beta Epsilon Corp. v. Boston, 65 N. E. (Mass.) 824;
Delta Kappa Epsilon v. Lawler, supra.Therefore the principal case would
seem to be sound, although the building was situated on the campus.
As was remarked in the two cases above, it cannot, for this purpose,
be regarded as anything more than a student boarding house, and
therefore its occupancy is not for literary and scientific purposes.
However, as the law progresses, spreading out in the adaptibility of
the common law to meet new situations and conditions, it does not
seem too much to expect the courts to listen to an argument, that as
they have exempted within these clauses college dormitories, from
which is derived a large proportion of the income from student payments, they should also include those dormitory buildings owned and operated solely by the students themselves, with no intent to make financial profit, and supported by a pro rata division of actual expense. If the
purpose of a dormitory owned by the college and occupied by students
only, is literary and scientific within the meaning of the Legislature,
it is perhaps an undue refinement which characterizes a dormitory occupied and owned by the same kind of students as unliterary and unscientific in its purposes, and therefore taxable in the same measure as
any private boarding house managed for pecuniary profit.
TRESPASS.
In the case of Knickerbocker Steamboat Co. v. Cusack, 172 Fed. Rep.
358 (igog) the question arose as to the liability in damages of one who
prefers a charge against an innocent person which leads
to his commitment by a magistrate. Generally speaking
the defendant in the resulting action for false imprisonLiabilityfor
ment is liable in damages for the natural and probable
Damages In

consequences of his act and hence there seems to be no
question of such liability up to the moment the case is
taken from his hands by the committing officer. But
when the defendant has merely laid a complaint before
a magistrate, who, believing that such facts bring the case within the
law and that there are sufficient grounds to make a case against the
prisoner, orders him to jail, there seems to be some conflict of authorities as to whether this is one of the natural and probable consequences
of the defendant's act and hence a matter for which he is liable.
Perhaps the cases may best be reconciled upon the theory that where
certain facts are laid before a magistrate, and he, in applying the law
thereto, makes a mistake either in regard to their sufficiency to warrant his holding the prisoner, or in his jurisdiction over the case, the
person making the complaint is not liable, beyond the bare arrest.
Barberv.Stetson, 73 Mass. (856) 53; Teal v. Fissel,28 Fed. (1886) 351;
Newman v. Railroad, 54 Hun. (889) 335. But if, on the other hand,
the complainant lays before the magistrate unwarranted statements of
fact, upon which, if they were true, the latter would be derelict in his
duty should he refuse to act, then his action in holding the accused
flows naturally from the unjustifiable assertions of the former, and he
should be held liable for all damage done the plaintiff from the moFalse imprigonment
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ment of his arrest until he was set at liberty. Shea v. Manhattan R. R.

Co., i5 Daly (I89o) 528; Murphy v. Countiss, i Harr. (Del. 1833) 143;
McGarrahan v. Lavers, I5 R 1. (I888) 302.

This theory seems in line with the case under discussion, but goes
to the point upon which the court refused to commit itself. By considering that the damages assessed were adequate no matter which view
was taken as to the point where defendants' liability ceased, they left
in doubt the real point at issue, which, upon the foregoing grounds
could readily have been decided, and the law settled.

